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Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Perception 
 
John Shannon Hendrix 
 
 
In an early treatise, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magni-
tudes into Philosophy (Versuch, den Begriff der negative Grössen in die 
Weltweisheit einzuführen, 1763), Immanuel Kant developed a theory about 
thoughts that are fleeting, negated or cancelled, obscured or darkened. As 
certain thoughts become clearer, the other thoughts become less clear and 
more obscured (Verdunkelt). Kant’s concept was influenced by the petites 
perceptions of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He invoked Leibniz in establish-
ing that only a small portion of the representations which occur in the soul, 
as the result of sense perception, are clear and enduring.1 
      Gottfried Leibniz conceived of minute perceptions of objects or ideas 
which have too little intensity to effect conscious thought. The minute per-
ceptions contribute to ordinary perceptions, but they are so small and there 
are so many of them that they pass unnoticed in the consciousness connected 
to perception. There are far more minute, unnoticed perceptions than there 
are conscious perceptions. In the New Essays on Human Understanding, we 
are unaware of objects or ideas being perceived, of the activity of the percep-
tion. Until they are combined with other perceptions, most perceptions are 
too minute to be distinguished or distinctive. In The Monadology of Leibniz, 
conscious perceptions follow unconscious perceptions, because “one percep-
tion can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion 
can in a natural way come only from a motion.”2 By the time of Freud, the 
minute perceptions of Leibniz were referred to as unconscious mental states, 
representations or ideas (Unbewusste Vorstellungen).  
      The minute perceptions are “vivid in the aggregate but confused as to the 
parts,”3 suggesting that perception is only clear when it has been organized 
into a totality, as Plotinus described, and which would be a basis of Kant’s 
theory of perception. In Plotinus, perception is organized into a totality by 
the activity of the intellectual through imagination, the image-making power, 
and the logos endiathetos, the word which is thought but not spoken, the lin-
guistic structure in thought. In Kant, perception is organized into a totality 
by the categories of a priori intuition acting through the schemata in the im-
agination, producing what Kant called the “manifold.” For Leibniz, the rela-
tion of the parts to the aggregate in perception represents the relation of the 
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finite to the infinite, and the relation of the individual subject to the universe. 
An individual is defined by their perceptions which go unnoticed, the vestige 
of which form a palimpsest in the individual’s consciousness (in discursive 
reason). Traces of previous perceptions, of sense objects or of ideas, contrib-
ute to a present state of consciousness. While there is no consciousness of 
the previous perceptions, “they could be known by a superior mind,” that is, 
the nous poietikos, or the intellectual of Plotinus, the more complex form of 
thinking. The traces of the unconscious perceptions in memory play a role in 
the becoming conscious of the residues of images, or mnemic residues for 
Freud, in the processes of sense perception, imagination, and intellection, in 
the formation of the aggregate or manifold out of the individual perceptions. 
      Those unnoticed perceptions are also responsible for the “pre-established 
harmony between the soul and the body” for Leibniz, the relation between 
intellect and sense perception, and the perceptions determine equilibrium in 
behavior and activity. The perceptions cause a “disquiet,” as in the pathos 
caused by sense perception for Plotinus, in nous pathetikos, and they also 
cause desire, in the searching on the part of discursive thought for that inac-
cessible element of its existence. All conscious perceptions contain those 
unnoticed perceptions; they would not exist without them. Leibniz cited Plo-
tinus in asserting the necessity of the perceptions and ideas which are unclear 
and indistinct, partly resulting from the obscurity of sense knowledge, partly 
resulting from the inaccessibility of certain mechanisms of intellection to 
discursive reason. “Although the mind, as Plotinus rightly says, contains a 
kind of intelligible world within it,” the intellectual or nous poietikos, “very 
few things in us can be known distinctly, and the remainder are hidden in 
confusion, in the chaos of our perceptions as it were,”4 according to Leibniz. 
      In the tradition of classical philosophy, intellectual ideas “do not come 
from the senses,” according to Leibniz in the New Essays on Human Under-
standing (p. 81). They are the product of the inner reflection of the mind, de-
pendent upon intelligibles not connected to sense perception. Ideas that come 
from the senses are confused, as Plato established, in the same way that indi-
vidual perceptions are confused before they are conceived as contributing to 
an aggregate, which is a product of intellect not connected to the act of con-
scious sense perception. Products of the nous poietikos are distinct and not 
contaminated by the lack of clarity of the sensible form, species sensibilis, in 
the nous hylikos or pathetikos, thought connected to sense perception. Ideas, 
products of nous poietikos or the intellectual, exist without our being aware 
of them (as in the species apprehensibilis), as Plotinus established. Leibniz 
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described them as “natural tendencies…dispositions and attitudes…” (p. 
106). We also have traces of perceptions of which we are not aware (as in 
the residues of the species sensibilis), but it is possible at any time to become 
aware of either sensible or intelligible forms, the traces of which form the 
palimpsest of conscious experience. We are hindered in our awareness of 
them, in the inner reflection of the mind, by being distracted by the multi-
plicity and confusion of individual sense perceptions, according to Leibniz, 
exactly as Plotinus described. 
      We are also unaware of how individual sense perceptions are received 
and sometimes altered as they are processed in the mechanisms of intellect 
and imagination, according to Leibniz. In the simple act of perception, we 
are unaware of the mechanisms of intellect and imagination which determine 
the particular forms that are directly perceived. For example, in An Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision in 1709, George Berkeley asserted that the 
quality of distance cannot be immediately perceived of itself, but must be a 
judgment that is learned through an accumulation of sense perceptions in re-
lation to discursive thought, as in the thought of Grosseteste. Judgment, ac-
cording to Berkeley, or acquired understanding, the product of a higher 
intellect, is the product of experience rather than immediate sense percep-
tion; it therefore necessarily involves memory, the traces of perceptions of 
sense objects and ideas, the accumulation of which leads to the development 
of the imagination, the image-making power. In the Fourth Dialogue of the 
Alciphron of Berkeley, “we perceive distance not immediately but by media-
tion of a sign, which has no likeness to it or necessary connection with it, but 
only suggests it from repeated experience, as words do things” (§8).5 The 
sign is an intelligible, a product of nous poietikos, intellection not connected 
to sense perception. The sign unconsciously determines the sense perception, 
especially of a quality like distance, which is a product of higher intellection.  
      The sign is constructed by the intellectual, and has no necessary relation 
to the sense perception of the object. As Berkeley explained in the New The-
ory of Vision, we are “exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are 
perceived only by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate 
objects of sight” (§66). When we perceive an object, we are unaware that 
what we are perceiving is the sensible form of the object which has no im-
mediate connection to the object itself, and that the sensible form is formed 
in relation to the intelligible form, the idea of the form of the object, by the 
inaccessible nous or intuition. It is the idea of the object as given by intellect 
that is immediately grasped, the intelligible form, rather than the image itself 
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of the object, the sensible form, which is imprinted on memory as a seal or 
sign. The objects themselves, according to Berkeley, “are not seen, but only 
suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which 
alone are seen” (Alciphron, §12). The proper object of sight is the seal or 
sign, the imprint or mnemic residue, the intelligible form, which are con-
structed in intellect and language, memory and imagination, as for Plotinus. 
In the Alciphron, “it will not seem unaccountable that men should mistake 
the connection between the proper objects of sight and the things signified 
by them to be founded in necessary relation or likeness…” (§11). It is thus 
“easy to conceive why men who do not think should confound in this lan-
guage of vision the signs with the things signified,” the intelligible form and 
the sensible form, in conscious thought. Conscious thought and perception 
are dependent on the mechanisms of the intellectual, nous poietikos, the clas-
sical concept of the higher intellect. 
      In the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant (“A” version, 1781), it is impos-
sible to know an object as a pure sensible object, its noumenal quality, out-
side its conception as an intelligible in intellect; perception in intellection 
transcends the experience of the sensible world in perception. The experi-
ence of the world is based on the inaccessibility of reason to the world. The 
constructed coherence and totality of the sensible world are necessary for 
perception, as perception is a basis for reason, but such totality is impossible 
in perception itself; it is only given by a priori intuition. The manifold of the 
sensible world is inaccessible to conscious reason: “The absolute whole of 
all appearances—we might thus say—is only an idea; since we can never 
represent it in image, it remains a problem to which there is no solution” 
(A328).6 Reason as a whole is unrepresentable to itself, and requires the in-
accessible nous, intuition or nous poietikos, in order for it to explain itself to 
itself. Imprints of sensible objects in perception are “mere representations,” 
as for Plotinus or Berkeley, “which as perceptions can mark out a real object 
only in so far as the perception connects with all others according to the rules 
of the unity of experience” (A495), in a manifold. 
      As for Berkeley, the relation between thought and a sense object that is 
perceived is never direct and is always mediated by the a priori understand-
ing of the object in a totality, according to Kant. “Reason is never in imme-
diate relation to an object, but only to the understanding” (A643), the 
intellection of the object. The transcendental idea, then, is not just a concept 
of an object, but a “thoroughgoing unity of such concepts…” (A645). The 
idea of an object is not possible outside the totality of the unity of objects, 
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just like a unit of time is not possible outside the totality of time, or a unit of 
space is not possible outside the totality of space. The sensible is not possi-
ble without the intelligible, and discursive reason is not possible without no-
etic reason. The object is singular while the idea of it is synthetic, composed 
of traces of previous sense perceptions and ideas, and judgments made, thus 
the idea of the object cannot possibly correspond to the object. 
      Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Anthropologie in 
pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1798), although a late work, addressed subjects that 
went back to Kant’s lectures at the Albertus University of Königsberg be-
ginning in 1772.7 In the Anthropology, Kant identified ideas of which we are 
not aware with the petites perceptions of Leibniz. “Sense perceptions and 
sensations of which we are not aware but whose existence we can undoubt-
edly infer, that is, obscure ideas…,” Kant said, “constitute an immeasurable 
field.”8 Ideas of which we are not aware, like perceptions of which we are 
not aware, constitute most of our ideas, as Kant explained in Section 5 of the 
Anthropology, “On the Ideas We Have Without Being Aware of Them.” 
Kant posited two levels of consciousness. The first is direct or unmediated 
(unmittelbar), full consciousness in perception. The second is indirect or 
mediated (mittelbar), partially unconscious perception involving indirect 
representations that are dark and obscure (dunkel), like the petites percep-
tions of Leibniz; “we can be indirectly conscious of having an idea, although 
we are not directly conscious of it” (p. 18). We draw conclusions about what 
we perceive without being conscious of perceiving every detail, because, as 
for Berkeley, what we perceive is determined by our understanding of it 
gained from experience. The majority of our perceptions are of the details 
which we do not consciously perceive, but which contribute to the conclu-
sions and judgments we make in the act of perceiving.  
      We are often victimized by the obscure ideas and sense perceptions, 
which cloud our conscious perceptions, and our understanding of ourselves, 
as we become an object of obscure ideas, according to Kant. Cognition and 
perception are defined as a synthesis of the clear and obscure ideas and per-
ceptions. Cognition consists of a union of an active capacity and a passive 
capacity, as in the active intellect (nous poietikos) and passive intellect (nous 
hylikos) of Aristotle, in the activity of combining and separating ideas. The 
ideas associated with the passive mind, by which the thinking subject is af-
fected, belong to the “sensual cognitive faculty” (Anthropology, p. 25), nous 
hylikos, the lower of the two faculties. Sensual cognition is passive in rela-
tion to ideas and also to the “inner sense of awareness,” the subjective facul-
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ty that makes cognition possible through imagination.  
      Intellectual cognition, the higher faculty, on the other hand, has the 
“character of spontaneity of apperception,” as in nous poietikos, which is 
“the pure consciousness of the act which constitutes thought,” entailing pure 
logical deduction. Apperception is the apprehension of the manifold or to-
tality of perception. All empirical or sensuous perception and cognition can 
only be of phenomena, of objects as they appear, as opposed to noumena, 
objects as they are in themselves. The receptivity of objects of sense as phe-
nomena requires an a priori intuition independent of the empirical sense per-
ception. As Plotinus and Grosseteste argued, the sensible form, is always 
already an intelligible form. That which is perceived by the senses is prede-
termined by the intellectual faculty in the intuition of inner experience. The 
formal character of the receptivity of sense objects in the inner intuition is 
time, according to Kant. Time is the category of a priori intuition that makes 
possible inner experience and sense perception in passive intellect, because it 
is an archetypal or intelligible category which is not subject to the divisions 
and multiplicity of discursive reason in passive intellect or the phenomenal 
objects of the sensual world.       
      But “through inner experience I always know myself only as I appear to 
myself” (Anthropology pp. 26–7). Appearance is the product of empirical 
intuition and understanding, that is, intellectual cognition, rather than judg-
ment, or discursive cognition. My perception of my inner experience is in the 
form of the intelligible form, which I have constructed in my imagination, 
but the source of which I do not have access to. Imagination (facultas imagi-
nandi) is the ability to form an image in the mind’s eye that is independent 
of a sensual object or image. Imagination, like cognition, is a synthesis of the 
passive and the active. The passive imagination is reproductive, “a faculty of 
the derived representation (exhibitio derivativa)” (p. 56), merely reproducing 
empirical perceptions as they are recalled to mind within the framework of 
the category of time in a priori intuition. The active imagination is produc-
tive, producing an original representation of an object (exhibitio originaria) 
that precedes experience, taking place in intuition rather than empirical cog-
nition. Perception of intelligibles in the imagination (phantasia), and percep-
tion of the a priori categories of space and time, is a faculty of productive 
imagination. Passive imagination is connected to empirical cognition, or ex-
perience, and is presupposed by it. Active imagination is a function of intel-
lectual cognition, while passive imagination is a function of discursive 
cognition, exactly as it was for Plotinus. 
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      Kant outlined a theory of the imagination in his Reflections on Anthro-
pology (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie) of 1776–8, and continued to develop 
it in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) and the Critique of Judgment 
(1790). The imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason is seen primarily as 
the higher, productive imagination, and the imagination in the Critique of 
Judgment is seen in relation to aesthetic judgment. As for Plotinus, the imag-
ination mediates between sense perception and intellectual cognition. The 
primary role of imagination is to transform the categories of a priori intuition 
into the schemata that organize sense perception and discursive reason. The 
importance that Kant placed on the imagination is the equivalent of the im-
portance that Plotinus placed on the imagination in classical philosophy. As 
in Plotinus, there is a higher imagination and a lower imagination, one in-
strumental in the reception and understanding of intelligibles, and one in-
strumental in the reception and understanding of sense perceptions. In the 
various Reflexionen, the notes prior to 1781, and in the Reflexionen zur An-
thropologie in particular, Kant defined a variety of imaginative functions in 
relation to varying degrees of connection to the sensible world, and varying 
degrees of productive capabilities. These were summarized very clearly by 
Rudolf Makkreel in Imagination and Interpretation in Kant. 
      The formative faculty (Bildungsvermögen) is the power to organize and 
give form to intelligibles in intuition, which for Plotinus involved the logos 
endiathetos, the word in language, and the production of a visual representa-
tion or reflection in the mind’s eye. The lower imagination, operating in rela-
tion to sense objects or phenomena, storing and preserving them as the eidos 
or species sensibilis, is called the Bildungskraft by Kant. The imagination is 
the storehouse (Vorrath) of representations. The Bildungskraft is seen to 
have the power to give form to an intuition or an intelligible, to create a sen-
sible form from an intelligible form. The higher imagination, called imagina-
tive formation or Einbildung, operates without any connection to 
phenomena, or sensible or intelligible form. It is able to produce rather than 
just reproduce, and create rather than just recreate. Einbildung is a function 
of nous poietikos, while Bildungskraft is a function of nous hylikos. Einbild-
ung forms images through invention (as in the fingendo of Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten) and abstraction (as in the abstrahendo of Christian 
Wolff).9  
      Rudolf Makkreel summarized eight levels of image formation, six of 
them involving the mechanisms of imagination. Bildung is the general ability 
to organize and give form to intelligibles in intuition which is made use of 
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by the mechanisms of imagination. Urbildung is the form of intellectual in-
tuition which is put to use by the higher forms of imagination in the higher 
intellect,  nous poietikos. The lower imagination is composed of Abbildung, 
Nachbildung, and Vorbildung. Abbildung is direct image formation, the 
power to depict a sensuous object, or reproduce it as phenomenon. Abbild-
ung makes the image of a sensible object visible so that it can be processed 
by the other levels of imagination within the temporal category of a priori 
intuition. The image of the Abbildung is limited only to the present moment. 
Nachbildung involves the reproduction of images that have already been 
formulated by the Abbildung, thus adding a temporal dimension. The Vor-
bildung, as a function of Abbildung and Nachbildung, reproduces images 
from the past and present in anticipation of future images, adding the tem-
poral dimension of the future, and creating a storehouse of images which be-
comes the vocabulary for sense experience and discursive reason. The 
activities of Abbildung, Nachbildung, and Vorbildung are connected to dis-
cursive reason and sense perception, and they contribute to the substance of 
experience which is defined by the manifold in the process of apperception, 
the building of sense experiences of objects and ideas in an architectonic that 
provides the ground of experience and the self-consciousness of thought. 
The architectonic is subject to the temporal categories in intuition in the in-
ner experience, and the spatial categories of intuition in sense perception. 
The activities of Nachbildung and Vorbildung generate images according to 
empirical laws of association and are connected to sense objects, but they 
nevertheless become functions of an active intellect rather than a passive in-
tellect, in that they are governed by the categories of a priori intuition. 
      The higher imagination is composed of Einbildung, Ausbildung, and 
Gegenbildung, the three categories of imagination that are not connected to 
sense perception or empirical experience, and are thus solely the product of 
intellectual cognition or the nous poietikos. Einbildung is the power to invent 
images not connected to sense perceptions. It is an activity of the soul rather 
than material representation, although its invented image (Erdichtung) must 
be derived from the images of sense perception. Ausbildung is responsible 
for the completion of the invented images in intellection which leads to the 
final formation of the invented image in Gegenbildung as symbolic or ana-
logical, an archetype or intelligible, formed by the schemata from the catego-
ries in a priori intuition.  
      In Gegenbildung, the invented, intelligible images become linguistic sig-
nifiers, in the same way that the intelligibles of Plotinus are reflected as im-
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ages formed by the logos endiathetos, unspoken language, in discursive rea-
son. The Gegenbildung completes the process of the intelligible, the source 
of which as an active intellect, becoming a material form in a representation 
or an image in perception, through the analogue (symbolum) or sign of the 
logos. The schemata for the three stages of higher imagination unfold from 
the temporal categories of a priori intuition. The pure form of archetypal 
formation in the Gegenbildung is the Urbildung, which has no connection 
whatsoever to the material world, but is solely a pure quality of the soul. The 
Urbildung precedes the mechanisms of imagination in cognition. 
      Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics (Vorlesungen über Metaphysik) consist 
of a set of lectures delivered between 1778 and 1780 and are preserved in 
student notes. In them the functions of the lower imagination are elaborated 
upon, leading to more developed discussions in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Abbildung creates images which are representations in the present; Na-
chbildung recreates images which are representative of the past; and Vor-
bildung creates images which anticipate future image formation in cognition 
and sense perception. Each is tied to the mechanisms of sense perception and 
material images, but also depend on active intellect and intellectual cognition 
in their formative powers. The manifold, for example, is present even in Ab-
bildung, as individual perceptions immediately participate in a totality, in a 
process of “running through” (durchläuft) the manifold. The mind is con-
scious in sense perception of forming and receiving images which are com-
posites of many points of view, in the process of apperception. The variety 
of petite perceptions of an object are “gathered together” (zusammen nimmt), 
although sometimes they can be overwhelming, which Kant discussed later 
in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment. 
      Abbildung combines perceptions from the present, past and future. It thus 
involves the reproductive processes of Nachbildung and the anticipatory 
processes of Vorbildung. The mechanism of imagination connected to each 
is a form of empirical, discursive reason. Its function is to preserve objects of 
perception. The functions of the higher imagination, Einbildung, Ausbildung, 
and Gegenbildung, have the capacity of “producing images out of them-
selves (aus sich selbst) independently of the reality of objects.”10 They have 
the ability to absorb the particular perceptions connected to empirical or dis-
cursive reason into the manifold or totality of experience, and they have the 
ability to form images not connected to immediate sense experience, in a 
higher form of intellection, as in nous poietikos, that operates without the 
consciousness of sense perception. The linguistic signifiers of Gegenbildung, 
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or symbolic analogues, manufacture links between sense perception and in-
tellection that are not given by perception or discursive reason alone. While 
even at the lowest level of imagination objects of sense perception are pre-
formed rather than directly given, in Gegenbildung, images in imagination 
are formed without any connection to the objects of sense perception. 
      In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, or the “A” version 
(1781), the “transcendental aesthetic” is the “science of all principles of a 
priori sensibility…” (A21). In the transcendental aesthetic, space is defined 
as an a priori concept that is applied to sense experience, rather than being a 
quality of sense experience or being derived from sense experience: “Space 
is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions” 
(A24). An a priori representation, or intuition of sensibility, is taken as a 
concept. Space does not exist in empirical reality, it only exists as a concept 
in intellection. At the same time, space can only be a representation, to dis-
cursive reason, and not a directly knowable reality. Space is a necessary rep-
resentation because it is impossible to conceive of the absence of space, thus 
all intuition is based on the presence of space in representation. In the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, or the “B” version (1787), space 
must therefore be “the condition of the possibility of appearances” (B39), 
and thus a condition of the possibility of all images formed in imagination. 
Space must necessarily be an unconscious intuition of sensibility: we are not 
conscious of the necessity of the a priori concept of space during the process 
of perception, because space appears to us to be an empirical perception in 
discursive, conscious reason. The grounds of perception and reason are inac-
cessible to us in conscious thought. 
      Space is a manifold, because it cannot be divided. As a consequence, ge-
ometry, or the geometrical representation of space, does not exist as an em-
pirical reality, but rather only an a priori concept of intuition that is applied 
to empirical reality in perception and discursive reason. Therefore all prod-
ucts of geometry in intuitive imagination, in Gegenbildung and the higher 
forms of imagination not connected to sense perception, exist only as con-
ceptual structures applied to empirical reality. In that space is the form of all 
appearances, it is the necessary condition for the eidos, and the intelligible 
form. The forms of appearances, as intelligibles, precede actual perceptions, 
as established by Plotinus or Robert Grosseteste. Forms of appearances are 
based on principles, the principia conoscendi, that are the categories of a 
priori intuition unfolded in the imagination to form the underlying basis of 
sense perception and discursive reason, in the same way that for Plotinus the 
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intelligibles are unfolded in imagination through the logos endiathetos, the 
linguistic signifier of Kant’s Gegenbildung. 
      Time is also not an empirical concept derived from any experience, but 
rather a concept in a priori intuition that is defined by its apodictic necessity, 
as Kant explained in Section II of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Time is as 
well only a representation to discursive reason and sense experience, and is a 
necessary basis for the existence of the manifold, as a manifold cannot be 
conceived outside of a relation to the successions made possible by the con-
cept of time, along with the concept of space. It is impossible to conceive of 
any sensible reality outside of time or space. Time, like space, underlies the 
possibility of all perception and discursive reason, without our being con-
scious of it as a purely a priori intuitive concept with no necessary connec-
tion to the perceptions and thoughts of which we are conscious.       
      As space determines the form of perception, it is the form of outer sense. 
Time has no relation to the shape or position of the objects of perception, so 
it is the form of the inner sense, or the relations of representations in cogni-
tion. Time has no existence in spatial representation, but we attempt to repre-
sent it to ourselves in the form of spatial analogies: the continuous, 
undivided line representing linear time, or the infinitely recurring circle rep-
resenting cyclical time. In either case time is represented as a manifold 
which cannot be interrupted, although it can be divided, unlike space. The 
division of time is a function of discursive reason operating on the intuition 
of the inner sense. Regarding space, discursive reason cannot operate on out-
er sense, or the empirical reality to which it responds. The representation of 
both space and time to ourselves in perception and discursive reason is the 
product of an a priori intuition. 
      Because all sensual phenomena are representations and determinations of 
the mind, time precedes space in its apodictic necessity as an a priori condi-
tion of experience. The condition of the inner appearance, the intelligible 
form, determines the condition of the outer appearance, the sensible form. 
All representations, whether empirical or intuitive, are connected to the inner 
sense. Time in the inner sense is the condition of the possibility of the mani-
fold, as all things, all sensible perceptions, are given a relationship in time. 
In apperception, in the combination of perceptions which conform to the a 
priori manifold, all sense objects are given a place in space and time. The 
placement of the sense object is determined by a priori relationships of intui-
tion. A sense object that is perceived is understood in a particular spatial re-
lation to other objects, while the perception of the object is understood in 
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relation to the perception and representation of other objects in time. In 
dreams, objects in the imagination may appear independent of the spatial re-
lations that governed their perception as sense objects, and independent of 
the temporal relations that governed the perception of them, as analyzed by 
Freud. Dreams function independently of the manifold of space and time that 
organizes conscious reason. As Freud would say, dreams have no intention 
of communicating anything, so they are able to operated outside the frame-
work of the linguistic mechanisms, the linguistic signifier or the logos en-
diathetos, that transform intelligibles into images, establishing the basis of 
the relation between reason and perception, between the human mind and the 
world as it is perceived and represented. Dreams must be a function of the 
higher forms of imagination, the Einbildung, Ausbildung, and Gegenbildung 
of Kant, which operate independently of the relations of empirical perception 
and discursive reason, the relations dictated by the manifold or a priori cate-
gories of space and time. 
      Time is necessary for a manifold to be understood or represented as a 
manifold to conscious thought. Time is the basis for the “synthesis of appre-
hension” (A99) that is connected to the representation of the manifold and 
the intuition that is the basis of the manifold. The synthesis of apprehension 
is a priori, prior to empirical experience and representation, and not connect-
ed to empirical experience. Thus it functions in the higher forms of imagina-
tion, as in intellection or nous poietikos. The representations of space and 
time that are given to discursive reason depend on the synthesis of apprehen-
sion, as a manifold itself. The manifold, composed of space and time as the 
categories of a priori intuition, depends of the synthesis of apprehension, 
which is a synthesis of the inner and outer sense, and of a priori intuition and 
perception. It is thus a synthesis of the subjective (ideal) and the objective 
(real), and represents an absolute in Hegelian terms. The absolute, as the 
manifold and the synthesis of apprehension, is necessary for all thought and 
experience. Without the categories of a priori intuition, empirical imagina-
tion would be unknowable to conscious reason, and would be unable to func-
tion in relation to sense perception. 
      Time, as the a priori category of inner sense or intuition, is the necessary 
ground of the “synthetic unity of appearances” (A101) in the manifold, and 
makes possible the reproduction of them in the imagination, and the repre-
sentation of them to discursive reason. Appearances “are not things in them-
selves,” but rather “the mere play of our representations,” as phenomena 
rather than noumena, based on the determinations of inner sense, and the 
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categories of space and time. The play of the representations of appearances 
is possible in the higher forms of imagination and intellection, thinking and 
imagining not connected to the empirical experience. Freed from the rela-
tions of perception governed by the rules of synthetic apprehension and the 
categories of the manifold, appearances can be reproduced and reconstructed 
by imagination in such a way that different realities from empirical reality 
can be created. Different realities are bound to the categories of space and 
time in conscious thought, but in unconscious thought and imagination, in 
dreams for example, realities can be created from the representation of ap-
pearance, the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz of Freud, outside the unconscious 
manifold. The transcendental synthesis of imagination, which is a product of 
the synthesis of apprehension in the manifold, or the absolute, is the condi-
tion for the possibility of all experience, which is the condition for the possi-
bility of the reproduction of appearances in imagination. 
      Thus the “synthesis of apprehension” in reason is “inseparably bound up 
with the synthesis of reproduction” (A102) in imagination. The synthesis of 
apprehension is the transcendental ground of the possibility of all 
knowledge, both empirical and a priori, while the synthesis of reproduction 
in imagination is the transcendental ground of all thought. The succession of 
representations in the reproduction of images in the imagination is made 
possible by the category of time; without the succession of images, con-
scious thought would not be possible. The unity of the manifold can only be 
given as a representation in conscious thought; as an a priori category, time 
is inaccessible to conscious thought. The unity of time only exists as it is un-
folded in discursive reason through the mechanisms of imagination, in the 
translation of intelligibles to images through language. The products of the 
categories of space and time, geometry and mathematics, can only function 
as organizing principles in relation to perception in conscious reason, alt-
hough as pure concepts they only exist in intuition, as intelligibles.  
      The relation of the unity of apperception to the synthesis of imagination 
is defined as understanding. We understand something in perception when it 
corresponds to the a priori idea of it, as it has been apprehended in imagina-
tion. All possible perceptions must conform to the “necessary unity of the 
pure synthesis of imagination” (A119); otherwise they would not be knowa-
ble. The a priori modes of knowledge that contain such unity in the under-
standing are the categories, the “pure concepts of understanding.” 
Knowledge must include an understanding related to the objects of percep-
tion; such understanding is given by a priori intuition and imaginative syn-
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thesis. All appearances and representations must conform to the understand-
ing, as the sensible form must conform to the intelligible form. All experi-
ence of perception is made possible by noetic thinking of objects as 
phenomena or representations in the unity of the manifold of synthetic ap-
perception in a priori intuition; objects cannot be known in themselves, nor 
can they be known as phenomena. Appearances have a “necessary relation to 
the understanding”: they would not be possible without it. 
      If an appearance were not an object of knowledge, it would have no ob-
jective reality and no existence, according to Kant, recalling the idealism of 
Berkeley. All appearances contain a manifold a priori, and can only be 
known in combination, derived from the transcendental synthesis of intuition 
and higher imagination, in combination with the empirical synthesis of lower 
imagination. The action of the productive synthesis of the imagination di-
rected at perceptions is apprehension. Apprehension invests the form of the 
image or appearance in perception with the manifold of intuition, and in or-
der to do so it must have previously processed the appearance in the imagi-
nation, recalling again the thought of Berkeley, as in the Alciphron “we 
perceive distance not immediately but by mediation of a sign, which has no 
likeness to it or necessary connection with it, but only suggests it from re-
peated experience, as words do things” (§8), and in the New Theory of Vi-
sion, we are “exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are perceived 
only by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate objects of 
sight” (§66). None of this is possible without the “subjective ground” of the 
inner sense or category of a priori intuition that is time, which organizes per-
ceptions in relation to past and subsequent perceptions in the empirical facul-
ty of the imagination: Abbildung, creating representations in the present; 
Nachbildung, recreating images which represent the past; and Vorbildung, 
creating images which anticipate future images.  
      The subjective ground of time governs the rules of association between 
images in perception, imagination, and apprehension. While the subjective 
ground is the inner sense or intuition, the objective ground is consciousness 
in perception and apprehension. The objective ground of consciousness is 
necessary to unite all appearances in empirical imagination as part of the 
same and only consciousness. Even if the appearances were ordered in suc-
cession by the intuition of time, they would still not have the necessity of 
participating in the same unity. The single consciousness insures that all ap-
pearances conform to the categories, the universal principles that are the ba-
sis of knowledge. The unity is found in apperception, and all appearances 
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must conform to the unity of apperception in order to be apprehended. The 
unity of apperception is the “objective unity of all empirical consciousness in 
one consciousness” (Critique of Pure Reason, A123), which is “the neces-
sary condition of all possible perception.” All appearances must have a cer-
tain affinity in a manifold, which is a consequence of the transcendental 
synthesis in imagination. 
      The necessary unity of apperception is provided by the transcendental 
synthesis of the productive imagination, the subjective inner sense, in com-
bination with consciousness in perception and thought, the Cartesian “I 
think.” Transcendental apperception is distinguished from empirical apper-
ception, just as transcendental imagination is distinguished from empirical 
imagination, because there must be an a priori representation for all percep-
tions, in order that perceptions might exist. As perceptions are dependent on 
a priori representations, a priori representations cannot be dependent on any 
empirical reality outside of apprehension and imagination. Transcendental 
apperception is the “transcendental unity of self-consciousness” (B132), as 
all representations are only unified in belonging to one and the same con-
sciousness. The self-consciousness of empirical representations is made pos-
sible by the transcendental unity of apperception, which is made possible by 
the manifold in intuition. While the unity of apprehension depends on the 
self-consciousness of the perceiving individual, it also depends on the partic-
ipation of individual self-consciousness in a universal or self-consciousness, 
ensuring the universality of the linguistic rules, derived from the principles 
of the categories, that govern the apprehension of a representation in imagi-
nation. Kant was in this way an early structuralist, arguing for the necessity 
of universal rules of thought and language. 
      The apperception of the manifold involves a synthesis of representations 
that is made possible through a consciousness of the synthesis in discursive 
reason, connected to empirical perception. Empirical consciousness has no 
necessary relation to the inner sense or the subjective experience without all 
individual representations being combined in a synthetic consciousness. 
Consciousness comes about in the relation between perception and language, 
specifically in the formation of the intelligible image in imagination, which 
connects the perceiving subject to what is being perceived, in the representa-
tion. I am only conscious of the world around me in my perception of it 
when I can represent it to myself in apperception and imagination. I am only 
conscious of the world around me as a representation to myself; my con-
sciousness is my perception of my own representations, in relation to my use 
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of language, which provides the representations, as for Plotinus. The “analyt-
ic unity of apperception” (B133), in empirical thought or discursive reason, 
is given by the “synthetic unity of apperception” in the transcendental aes-
thetic, the principles of a priori sensibility, which paves the way for the tran-
scendental unity of self-consciousness, and the possibility of knowledge and 
perception. 
      The synthesis of the manifold in pure concepts relates them to the unity 
of apperception, both transcendental and empirical, and is the basis for a pri-
ori knowledge, which depends on understanding, and the faculty of represen-
tation in imagination. Through the manifold of representations in 
imagination, in relation to the synthetic unity of apperception, understanding 
is able to identify the intuition in the inner sense as the basis of experience. 
The categories, the forms of the pure concepts, take objective form in the 
representations in the imagination, and are thus connected to the objects of 
sense perception, as they are themselves representations in the imagination. 
They are only appearances, “for it is solely of appearances that we can have 
a priori intuition” (B151). 
      The a priori synthesis of the sensible manifold of intuition, as it is repre-
sented to discursive reason, is called the “figurative synthesis” (synthesis 
speciosa), in contrast to the synthesis of the manifold in the categories of in-
tuition in understanding, which is the “intellectual synthesis” (synthesis in-
tellectualis). Both forms of synthesis are a priori and transcendental, and 
necessary for all other a priori knowledge. The figurative synthesis is the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, wherein the imagination repre-
sents an intelligible of a sense object in intuition. It is the higher, productive 
imagination, that is able to represent a sense object without the sense object 
being present. As for Plotinus, imagination operates midway between intui-
tion (intellection) and sense perception. It connects sensible representations 
from empirical experience with the synthesis in the categories of a priori in-
tuition, in its transcendental synthesis in the understanding. The intellectual 
synthesis is a product of understanding alone, without a connection to imag-
ination, or to sense perception. Figurative synthesis is connected to the low-
er, reproductive imagination, and the empirical laws of sense perception. 
Intellectual synthesis is connected to the higher, productive imagination, 
which does not involve the empirical laws of sense perception, as in the nous 
poietikos, the intellectual or productive intellect. Figurative synthesis is a 
rhetorical synthesis, as opposed to a literal synthesis, that is, a synthesis rep-
resented in language. 
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      In the thought of Plotinus, in a scheme that seems very similar to the 
Kantian one, and anticipated the concepts of Hegel and Freud, imagination 
facilitates the translation of sensible objects in perception to intellection. The 
intellectual act is not possible without an accompanying mental image. The 
ability to form the image (eidos), appearance or representation, in the mind’s 
eye is always accompanied by the “verbal expression” (Enneads IV.3.30),11 
or more accurately, the logos endiathetos, the word in thought, as Plotinus 
seems to have intended it. The intelligible image, and thus the sensible im-
age, is not possible without the linguistic expression of it, and linguistic ex-
pression is not possible without the intelligible image. Perception of sensible 
objects is only possible after the idea of the sensible object is articulated in 
language in intellection. While the “intellectual act is without parts,” accord-
ing to Plotinus, as in the a priori synthesis of the manifold in intuition, it has 
not been differentiated in discursive reason through the logos endiathetos in 
imagination, and thus in sense perception, and it “has not, so to speak, come 
out into the open, but remains unobserved within.”   
      But “the verbal expression,” or the logos endiathetos, “unfolds its con-
tent,” from intellection or intuition, “and brings it out of the intellectual act 
into the image-making power,” allowing imagination to form the intelligible 
image that corresponds to the sensible image in memory, as in the thought of 
Kant. In doing so, the linguistic articulation “shows the intellectual act as if 
in a mirror,” for Plotinus, or a representation, as a mirror reflection might 
represent a sensible object, but the linguistic articulation in discursive reason 
does not contain the intellectual act; the intellectual act, like the intellectual 
synthesis, and the productive imagination, remains separated from sense per-
ception and sensible reality, and discursive reason, wherein can be found the 
figurative synthesis, as the linguistic representation, logos endiathetos, of the 
intelligible, or the transcendental synthesis. The intellectual act of Plotinus is 
inaccessible, as the a priori transcendental synthesis of the manifold.  
      The logos endiathetos, as the unarticulated word, can be seen as Ploti-
nus’ “silent rational form” (Enneads III.8.6) and the “rational principle” 
which “must not be outside but must be united with the soul of the learner, 
until it finds that it is its own,” like the categories of a priori intuition in the 
inner sense of Kant. Once the soul of Plotinus  has “become akin to and dis-
posed according to the rational principle,” the logos, or the schemata of Kant 
unfolding the categories, it “utters and propounds it,” forming the representa-
tion of the intelligible idea in relation to the representation of the object of 
sense perception. The spoken word in language, logos prophorikos, is an im-
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itation of the logos endiathetos in the same way that the figurative synthesis 
is an imitation of the intellectual synthesis, and reproductive imagination is 
an imitation of productive imagination, but connected to perception. Accord-
ing to Plotinus, the logoi of discursive reason, “by means of sense-
perception—which is a kind of intermediary when dealing with sensible 
things—do appear to work on the level of sense and think about sense ob-
jects” (Enneads I.4.10). Discursive reason depends on representations of 
thought in intellect, or the representations of the categories in imagination. 
Consciousness “exists and is produced when intellectual activity is reflexive 
and when that in the life of the soul which is active in thinking is in a way 
projected back,” as the representation formed by the logos, “as happens with 
a mirror-reflection when there is a smooth, bright, untroubled surface.”  
      The schemata of Kant, in the words of Rudolf Makkreel, in Imagination 
and Interpretation in Kant, are “a priori products of the imagination that me-
diate between concepts and empirical appearances,”12 as the logos endiathe-
tos might mediate between the intelligible and the sensible form in the 
thought of Plotinus. The schema has no empirical content, but must be both 
intellectual and sensible, as the imagination of Plotinus is both intellectual 
and sensible. The schemata apply the categories to imagination in order to 
form the groundwork of the subjective empirical experience of the objects of 
sense perception. Imagination mediates between the categories as universal 
concepts and sensible intuition as composed of empirical particulars. The 
framework for the mediation is time, within which the categories are unfold-
ed as particulars, from the subjective intuition of inner sense to the objective 
cogitation of nous pathetikos or discursive reason. The framework of time 
allows for the temporal associations of representations to be combined in 
such a way as the manifold can be translated into perception. The most im-
portant function of the productive, transcendental imagination is to produce 
the temporal schemata, through representation in language, so that the sensi-
ble can be experienced as a manifold in intuition. 
      There are schemata of both sensible concepts in discursive thought and 
pure concepts of the understanding in intuition. As the framework for the 
function of imagination, which is both sensible and intelligible, reproductive 
and productive, schemata are both sensible and intelligible. The schemata of 
the pure concepts are independent of any sensible form and thus cannot be 
translated into an image, while the schemata of the sensible concepts are that 
through which images are possible in imagination. The schema is not a prop-
erty of a sensible concept, but is a necessary basis for any sensible concept. 
Immanuel Kant                                                                                              19 
 
The schema is an archetype, the universal concept to which all particular 
forms must conform, but in relation to which all are imperfect or incomplete 
realizations. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the example is given of the tri-
angle (A141), the schema of which cannot correspond to any image or repre-
sentation, as it is a construct of geometry and mathematics, manifestations of 
the categories of space and time, intuitions that are applied to sensible reality 
a priori, thus preceding any possible formal representation. 
      In the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, 1790), pleasure is connected with the “apprehension of the form 
of an object of intuition,” and expresses the “conformity of the object to the 
cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgement…” (VII, 
189, 17–24),13 recalling Ficino’s definition of love. The image is the form in 
the imagination, the intelligible form that is a product of a priori intuition; 
pleasure is a function of the imagination, not sense perception. All sense per-
ception is dependent on the synthesis of apprehension. Imagination is the ac-
tive faculty for the synthesis of the manifold, as connected to the 
understanding. The apprehension that produces pleasure is an apprehension 
of particular relations of space and time as given by the categories in intui-
tion. Sensations are synthesized in the imagination to create a form or ap-
pearance. If the synthesis of sensations corresponds with the pure a priori 
concepts, then pleasure results, as love and beauty for Ficino, and an object 
of sense, as the form or appearance in the imagination, is judged to be beau-
tiful. If a sense object does not conform to the organization of reality in 
sense perception as given by a priori intuition, then it is judged to be ugly.       
      In order for a sense object to be perceived, judged to be beautiful, and 
give pleasure, it must conform to the intelligible appearance of it in the im-
agination, derived from the categories of a priori intuition. Kant sees ele-
ments of sense perception such as colors, tones, shadows, etc., to be products 
of the manifold of perception, or apperception, rather than individual percep-
tions. They participate in spatial and temporal sequences, and in a play of 
perceptions that forms the manifold. The spatial and temporal sequences are 
not present in a perception itself, nor is the play of perceptions that forms the 
manifold, but they make the perception possible. No sense object can be per-
ceived outside a relation to other sense objects. Perceptions are brought to-
gether in the imagination, and sensible and intelligible forms in the 
imagination are a product of the manifold of perceptions in imagination, not 
individual sense objects outside their participation in the manifold. Pleasure 
and aesthetic judgment are the product of the manifold of perceptions, the 
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relations between objects of sense. Kant developed theories of language and 
perception in classical philosophy, in the neoplatonic, peripatetic, scholastic, 
and humanistic traditions, and laid the groundwork for theories of language 
and perception in the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan.  
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This essay was developed from sections of the chapter “Unconscious Thought in the 
Philosophy of Immanuel Kant” in Unconscious Thought in Philosophy and Psycho-
analysis, London: Palgrave Mamillan, 2015. 
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